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Mior and Skyfall Attacks Let Rogue Hosts Read AMD Confidential VMs

Photograph of AMD headquarters in Santa Clara, California, with the AMD sign in front of a glass office building.

Researchers have disclosed two attacks that can let a malicious cloud host read data inside AMD confidential virtual machines,. The attacks, named Mior and Skyfall, target Secure Encrypted Virtualization with Secure Nested Paging, known as SEV-SNP, on AMD EPYC server processors. SEV-SNP is designed to protect a virtual machine's memory even from the host's hypervisor, so the adversary here is exactly the one it is meant to keep out: the server operator.

Mior, developed by a team at ETH Zurich, is the more serious of the two. Tracked by AMD as CVE-2026-0462 with a CVSS 4.0 score of 5.9, it attacks SEV-SNP during startup. At launch, AMD's Platform Security Processor fills in the Reverse Map Table, which records who owns each memory page and what access is allowed. The researchers redirected the security processor's writes to an attacker-controlled PCIe device, such as a graphics card, instead of main memory. Startup completed without errors, but part of the real table, including the entry that protects the table itself, was left uninitialized.

From there, the team rewrote the table's protections, enabled debugging on a confidential virtual machine that had it disabled, and used the security processor's own debug commands to read and write its memory. The attack succeeded in all 1,000 test attempts and worked even with ciphertext hiding enabled. In a second demonstration, the researchers copied a harmless virtual machine's measurement into a malicious one, so the malicious machine produced signed attestation reports describing the harmless image instead. Attestation is how a customer verifies which software is running before releasing keys or data. Mior requires control of the hypervisor and of the server's BIOS or UEFI firmware, plus an attacker-controlled PCIe device. It was demonstrated on an EPYC 9135 processor based on Zen 5, and AMD lists only SEV-SNP as affected, not the earlier SEV or SEV-ES modes.

Skyfall, from researchers at ETH Zurich and Google, takes a different path. Tracked as CVE-2026-40671 with a CVSS score of 4.9, it builds on the Transient Scheduler Attacks disclosed in July 2025. When a hypervisor deliberately causes a virtual machine to fail to start, part of its saved state can remain cached without the usual cleanup, and the host can recover it through a timing side channel. The team recovered saved register values and a disk-encryption key from a test virtual machine,. Skyfall needs a malicious host or hypervisor but no hardware tampering. It was demonstrated on EPYC 7313 chips based on Zen 3 and on EPYC 9124 and 9334 chips based on Zen 4, but the leak was not shown on Zen 5.

AMD lists the same five EPYC families for both flaws: the 7003, 8004, 8005, 9004 and 9005 series. SEV firmware for Mior and microcode for Skyfall are dated August 12, with platform firmware for server makers targeted for November for Skyfall and December for Mior. Embedded EPYC fixes are due between January and April 2027.

The fixes live in host firmware, so tenants cannot apply them from inside a guest virtual machine. They depend on their server vendor or cloud provider to install BIOS and firmware updates, and systems that verify attestation should reject reports from platforms below the fixed trusted computing base levels. A November 14 Cloud Security Alliance analysis noted both were laboratory demonstrations, with no reported exploitation in the wild. For organizations running sensitive workloads on SEV-SNP, the immediate steps are to confirm their provider's firmware timeline and check attestation policy before trusting a confidential virtual machine with new secrets.

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